국제통화기금(IMF)이 10월8일 세계경제전망 보고서에서 세계 경제성장률 전망을 올해 2.9%, 내년 3.6%로 각각 제시해 지난 7월 전망시보다 각각 0.3%포인트와 0.2%포인트 낮췄다. 회복이 당시 전망했던 것보다 부진하지만 그런 대로 양호한 편이라고 결론지을 수 있는 수치다.
그러나 이 보고서 안에는 다운사이드 시나리오도 함께 포함돼 있다. 그 부분을 정리해 보고자 한다. 즉 세계 경제가 전세계 곳곳에서 실망스런 모습을 보이는 상황을 상정하는 것으로 이는 다음 상황일 가능성이 있다:
- 유로존 내 정책이 금융 파편화 해결에 실패하고 투자자들의 신뢰를 개선하는 데 실패함에 따라 투자 및 성장 약세 지속
- 신흥국 및 개발도상국 경제성장이 더욱 둔화되고 중국의 내수소비 위주 성장이 예상보다 여의치 않게 되어 중기적 시계에서 성장이 더욱 둔화; 이 경우 세계 무역 및 상품 가격 하락 촉발 가능
- 일본의 정책 집행 불충분, 특히 미흡한 구조조정, 기대인플레이션율의 지속적 상승 실패 등에 따른 GDP대비 부채비율 억제와 일본 국채에 대한 리스크 프리미엄 급증 예방을 위해 재정 긴축을 강화하는 상황
- 내년 미국 금융상황이 예상보다 더욱 위축되는 상황. 민간투자 회복 불발 및 그에 따른 잠재정상률 부진
- 위에 제시된 상황들로 인해 국제금융시장 동요 재발
이런 상황이 발생하면 다음 시나리오가 예상됨:
- 유로존: 성장률이 0.5% 위로 복귀하는 데 몇년이 더 소요되고 유로존 경상수지 흑자 축소 가능
- 일본: 성장률 0.5% 밑으로 반락, 경상수지 흑자 다시 GDP 대비 2% 이상으로 확대, 인플레이션 2% 목표 미달, 재정 상황 악화
- 중국: 성장률 중기적으로 6% 하회, 2018년까지 GDP 대비 경상수지 흑자 현재 2.5% 수준에서 5% 가까이로 확대
- 아시아 신흥국 전체: 2014년에 성장률 5.25% 미만으로 1%포인트 이상 하락한 뒤 횡보
- 중남미: 성장률 2013년 이후 소폭 하락한 뒤 다시 소폭 회복, 경상수지 적자 개선 불발
- 미국: 단기적으로는 금리 상승으로 경기 압박하겠으나 중기적으로 저성장 문제 해결 위해 당국이 정책금리를 장기간 유지하게 되면 성장률은 중기적으로 2.5% 수준 달성 가능할 듯
(아래는 원문임)
A likely scenario for the global economy is one of continued, plausible disappointments everywhere.
These disappointments could include the following:
• Investment and growth stay weak in the euro area, as policies fail to resolve financial fragmentation and fail to inspire confidence among investors.
• Growth in emerging market and developing economies softens further, and growth in China is lower in the medium term as the shift toward consumption-driven growth proves more complicated than expected. This has repercussions via trade and lower commodity prices.
• Policy implementation in Japan is incomplete. In particular, the scenario incorporates shortfalls in structural reforms, a failure of inflation expectations to durably move up to 2 percent, and consequently, more fiscal tightening to contain the debt-GDP ratio and prevent sharp increases in the risk premium on Japanese government bonds.
• U.S. financial conditions tighten more than assumed in the WEO forecast over the coming year. Also, private investment does not recover as forecast, and, consequently potential growth turns out lower than expected. Tighter financial conditions than assumed in the WEO projections are already partly priced into markets, and the scenario assumes that market rates increase further when the Federal Reserve tapers its asset purchases. Such overtightened financial conditions may be difficult to reverse in a timely manner because damage to the economy is observed with a lag and a resumption of asset purchases could be politically difficult.
• International financial markets experience further turbulence as all these factors raise risk perceptions and thus the returns demanded by investors.
These disappointments could include the following:
• Investment and growth stay weak in the euro area, as policies fail to resolve financial fragmentation and fail to inspire confidence among investors.
• Growth in emerging market and developing economies softens further, and growth in China is lower in the medium term as the shift toward consumption-driven growth proves more complicated than expected. This has repercussions via trade and lower commodity prices.
• Policy implementation in Japan is incomplete. In particular, the scenario incorporates shortfalls in structural reforms, a failure of inflation expectations to durably move up to 2 percent, and consequently, more fiscal tightening to contain the debt-GDP ratio and prevent sharp increases in the risk premium on Japanese government bonds.
• U.S. financial conditions tighten more than assumed in the WEO forecast over the coming year. Also, private investment does not recover as forecast, and, consequently potential growth turns out lower than expected. Tighter financial conditions than assumed in the WEO projections are already partly priced into markets, and the scenario assumes that market rates increase further when the Federal Reserve tapers its asset purchases. Such overtightened financial conditions may be difficult to reverse in a timely manner because damage to the economy is observed with a lag and a resumption of asset purchases could be politically difficult.
• International financial markets experience further turbulence as all these factors raise risk perceptions and thus the returns demanded by investors.
In this plausible downside scenario, global growth would be lower, monetary policy rates in advanced economies would stay even longer at the zero bound, and inflation would be subdued.
• Euro area growth would take a number of years to inch back above ½ percent, as activity in the periphery barely creeps out of the recession. The euro area’s current account surplus would be slightly smaller.
• In Japan, growth would fall back below ½ percent, and the current account surplus would widen again, exceeding 2 percent of GDP. Inflation would fall far short of the 2 percent target, and fiscal troubles would build.
• China would see growth below 6 percent in the medium term and a widening of the current account surplus from 2½ percent to almost 5 percent of GDP by 2018. For emerging Asia as a whole, growth would drop by more than 1 percentage point in 2014, to under 5¼ percent, and then move sideways.
• Latin America would see growth rates fall slightly after 2013, contrary to the baseline projection, and subsequently recover only modestly above 3 percent. The current account deficit would see little improvement.
• The United States would grow by about 2½ percent over the medium term. In the short term, higher interest rates weigh on activity, but over the medium-term activity resumes as lower growth induces policymakers to keep rates on hold for longer than under the baseline.
• In Japan, growth would fall back below ½ percent, and the current account surplus would widen again, exceeding 2 percent of GDP. Inflation would fall far short of the 2 percent target, and fiscal troubles would build.
• China would see growth below 6 percent in the medium term and a widening of the current account surplus from 2½ percent to almost 5 percent of GDP by 2018. For emerging Asia as a whole, growth would drop by more than 1 percentage point in 2014, to under 5¼ percent, and then move sideways.
• Latin America would see growth rates fall slightly after 2013, contrary to the baseline projection, and subsequently recover only modestly above 3 percent. The current account deficit would see little improvement.
• The United States would grow by about 2½ percent over the medium term. In the short term, higher interest rates weigh on activity, but over the medium-term activity resumes as lower growth induces policymakers to keep rates on hold for longer than under the baseline.
The world would be much less prosperous under this scenario than in the WEO baseline, and the policy challenges would be tougher. The number of jobs lost in the scenario relative to WEO baseline would be just under 20 million. Unemployment rates would stay at record highs for many years in the euro area periphery, and concerns about debt sustainability in various economies would return to the fore. Because growth in many emerging market economies would not pick up, it would be harder to satisfy demands for better public services and social safety nets. Such unmet demands could trigger further social tension in these economies. In advanced economies, monetary and fiscal policy space would be much more restricted. Therefore, the global economy would be more vulnerable to much worse scenarios. In the United States and Japan, for example, low growth rates could ultimately raise questions about the strength of the sovereign. It is, unfortunately, a world that could plausibly materialize unless policymakers take stronger action to address the important issues.
